For many decades, peace groups and left-wing parties such as the KKE have railed against the presence of the NATO and US forces at the Souda naval and air bases in Chania. Any new arrival of a US warship at Souda has been the occasion for noisy demonstrations in front of the Agora, proclaiming “NATO warmongers out”, “Crete for the Cretans” and similar slogans. The often-expressed fear is that the US military presence and installations will make the base, and the city of Chania, a potential target in the event of direct US involvement in the periodic conflagrations in the Middle East.

To date these concerns have seemed largely theoretical, and it is clear that successive Greek governments have rather found the US presence a welcome deterrent in the face of expansionist pressure from their eastern neighbour Türkiye, as well as any other potential threats. However, with the outbreak of the latest hostilities between Israel and Iran, the possibility of an Iranian attack on Souda needs at the least to be objectively assessed.

Iran’s missile inventory
The Missile Threat website of the CSIC’s Missile Defence Project carries the following assessment of Iran’s missile capabilities, dated August 2021: “Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, some capable of striking as far as Israel and Southeast Europe. Iran has invested significantly to improve these weapons’ precision and lethality. Such developments have made Iran’s missile forces a potent tool for Iranian power projection and a credible threat to US and partner military forces in the region. Iran is also an active proliferator, supplying missiles and rockets to partner and proxy groups in Iran, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Yemen.”

While the recent Israeli attacks on Iran and its proxies, and the Iranian response, will have substantially depleted Iran’s missile stocks and – if Israeli reports of attacks on its missile manufacturing bases are accurate – also its capacity to manufacture new ones, it must be assumed that Iran retains the ability to inflict damage on its attackers. Moreover, the overnight news that the US has directly entered the conflict by bombing Iran’s three key nuclear installations greatly increases the possibility of Iranian missile attacks on US assets in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The CSIC assessment includes the following list of Iranian missiles in operation or under development as of August 2021:

Missile name	Missile type	Range	Production status
Emad (Shahab-3 Variant)	MRBM	1,700 km	In development
Ghadr-1 (Shahab-3 Variant)	MRBM	1,950 km	In development
Fateh-110	SRBM	200 – 300 km	Operational
Fateh-313	SRBM	500 km	Operational
Khorramshahr	MRBM	2,000 km	In development
Koksan M1978	Artillery	40 – 60 km	Operational
Qiam-1	SRBM	700 – 800 km	Operational
Ra’ad	Antiship Cruise Missile	350 km	Operational
Safir	Space LaunchVehicle (SLV)	350 km altitude	Operational
Sejjil	MRBM	2,000 km	Operational
Shahab-1	SRBM	285 – 330 km	Operational
Shahab-2	SRBM	500 km	Operational
Shahab-3	MRBM	1,300 km	Operational
Simorgh	SLV	500 km altitude	In development
Soumar	Cruise Missile	2,000 – 3,000 km	Operational (presumed)
Tondar 69	SRBM	150 km	Operational
Ya-Ali	Land-Attack Cruise Missile	700 km	Operational
Zolfaghar	SRBM	700 km	Operational
MRBM – Medium Range Ballistic Missile; SRBM – Short Range Ballistic Missile; SLV – Space Launch Vehicle (for satellites)

As the CSIC map on the same page shows, Greece is just within the 2,000 km range of missiles launched from Iran, who appear to have several missiles with that range. While Israel has reportedly focussed on destroying Iran’s long-range missile capacity, Iran will have had little reason to make operational use of that capacity to date, and it is doubtful if anyone has accurate knowledge of what remains of it.

It is therefore worth considering what defences if any Greece and in particular Crete has against such missiles. An article in Friday’s (20th June) Haniotika Nea by the paper’s editor-in-chief Paraskevas Perakis quotes the CSIC data on Iran’s missile capacities and makes an assessment of defensive systems currently installed in Crete. What emerges from the assessment is that existing installations on the island are antiquated and inadequate as a defence against the most up-to-date missile systems. The following is an edited version of the article, with some of the technical detail removed.

Anti-missile defence in Crete
[Air defence systems possibly available in Crete include:]
The Patriot missile system, which according to the paper Kathimerini is currently being moved to Crete, in the latest edition of the system, MIM-104 PAC-3+, which by comparison with previous versions offers upgraded radar with a range of 170 km. The system is capable of engaging up to 9 targets simultaneously (tactical, ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft).

Since the year 2000 the Air Force has had at is disposal the Russian S-300 PMU1 surface-to-air missile system. It provides cover, amongst other things, against ballistic and tactical (battlefield) missiles with a range of 150 km. For the protection of the S-300s, a TOR M1 battery has been installed at Heraklion. This is a Russian-made self-propelled, tracked anti-aircraft system firing short-range surface-to-air missiles.
However, the S-300 does not appear to be operational, and last autumn it was made known that it would be withdrawn from service and replaced with Israeli-made systems such as David’s Sling, Barak MX and Spyder, as part of the Iron Dome project which aims to cover the Aegean complex of islands by 2026 at a cost of €2 billion.

At Chania there is also the French-made Crotale NG/GR, which was commissioned in the Greek Air Force in 2003. This is a mobile short-range air defence system (SHORAD) to provide cover for tactical and strategic targets from airborne threats, with the ability to engage low- and medium-height projectiles. The system is mounted on a towed trailer and incorporates a search radar with a range of 20 km.

Finally there is the veteran Velos system, of Swiss manufacture, which was commissioned in the Air Force in 1982. It is an all-weather mobile short-range air defence system, which combines missiles with rapid-fire cannon.

Supplementary systems
Air defence at Chania is supplemented by the portable Stinger missile of US and European manufacture, that operates as an infrared homing surface-to-air missile. It is designed to combat aircraft and helicopters flying at low or very low altitude.

Finally there is the long-established anti-aircraft machinegun MK 20-MOD Rh, of German manufacture. Its rapid rate of fire allows it to to be used to attack low or very low altitude targets as well as terrestrial ones. Able to fire 880-1,000 rounds per minute, it has an effective range of 1.2 km for aerial targets and up to 2.5 km for terrestrial ones.

Of all the above systems the only one which can counter modern long-range missiles is the Patriot, and that only under very specific conditions.
(Haniotika Nea, 20/06/25)

Crete’s air defence system is clearly in need of upgrading, and in confirmation of the Haniotika Nea article, a report on Ekathimerini.com on 19th June states that “An undisclosed number of Greek Patriot missile systems are being relocated to the Hellenic Navy and NATO base at Souda Bay in Crete to provide antiballistic protection to American assets in the region.”

The reorganisation of the Greek armed forces
As the reference to a Greek Iron Dome system suggests, the Mitsotakis government has long been aware of the need to upgrade Greece’s air defence capacities, along with carrying out a general overhaul of the armed forces. From its first term, it had engaged in a substantial arms purchase programme, which included the purchase of 24 new and slightly used Rafale fighter jets from the French, completed in January of this year, and the future purchase of 40 F35 fighters from the US, well as three new French Belharra frigates – now increased to four – the first of which is due for delivery by the end of 2025. The fighter purchases were aimed at achieving air superiority over Türkiye, whose participation in the F35 programme had been blocked by the US Congress, as a result of Ankara’s refusal to divest itself of the Russian S-400 air defence systems, purchased in 2019, whose use alongside US weaponry would be seen as security threat to NATO.

Earlier this year the Defence ministry, under Defence minister Nikos Dendias, announced a €25 billion overhaul of the armed forces, codenamed Agenda 2030, which takes advantage of new EU rule allowing off-budget expenditure on defence equipment in the face of the threats embodied in the war in Ukraine, and signs that the Trump government intends to reduce its commitment to Europe.

The overhaul will include pruning and rationalising of staff. As reported by Ekathimerini, “[The government] emphasise that an overly centralised command system, characterised by an excessive concentration of senior and high-ranking officers, is cumbersome, slow in making critical decisions, lacks agility and is rigid in hierarchical advancement.” Examples cited include the fact that, before the recent evaluations, the number of colonels serving in the army was more than three times the number of available positions. The officials stated that it is unreasonable for the Greek military to have more military bases and senior officers than the U.S. military, which is twenty times larger. Moreover, they argued that it is not rational for the navy to have 600 captains when it operates only 24 large-displacement warships, while simultaneously seeking to reduce expenses and increase salaries.

The Defence Minister told Parliament that the overhaul will be built around a planned air defence system called “Achilles Shield,” primarily aimed at addressing tensions with neighbouring Türkiye. Mr Dendias said that Greece plans to shift from traditional defence systems to a high-tech, networked strategy centred on mobile, AI-powered missile systems, drone technologies, and advanced command units, reducing reliance on conventional fleets. Significantly, the new Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, appointed in January 2024, General Dimitrios Houpis, is an electronic warfare specialist rather than the more traditional “field commander” leader typified by his predecessor General Konstantinos Floros.

Crete’s vulnerability
Returning to the question of whether Crete is likely to sustain an attack by Iranian missiles, this would seem to be a fairly remote possibility for now. If Iran decides to retaliate against Sunday’s US attacks on its nuclear facilities, it seems more probable that it would aim to inflict damage on US forces and assets in the Middle East, which are much closer to home, and where it can leverage the power of its proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houtis in Yemen.

Indeed, according to the New York Post, quoted in today’s Haniotika Nea, while US bases in Qatar, Bahrein, Iraq, Syria, Kuwait and the UAR have all been placed on high alert, this is not the case for Souda. This is despite the fact that from three to six refuelling tankers were dispatched from Souda for in-flight refuelling of the B2 bombers used during the raids, and the base was the scene of intense activity throughout the weekend, according to local reports.