With the surge of Iranian reprisal attacks currently under way on US bases and other targets in the Middle East, the question inevitably arises as to whether the Souda air and naval bases could become a target. Nine months ago the same question arose when the US and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear installations. While the current situation is more extreme, with the US proclaiming its intention to achieve “régime change” in Iran, the practical obstacles to a successful missile attack on Crete remain the same.

The Haniotika Nea has consulted Dr Minas Lyristis who is Junior Scholar for Gulf Affairs at the Cyprus-based think tank and business consultancy Strategy International, and an article by the paper’s managing director Paraskevas Perakis summarises his findings, which are given here.
Is there a threat to Souda?
At Souda, the article says, the customary measures for such situations are being implemented. The airport is operating normally, according to sources at the Ministry of National Defence, but the base is closed to all except authorised personnel. The site is in a state of vigilance but there is no “red alert”.
Speaking to Haniotika Nea, Dr Minas Lyristis, Junior Scholar at Strategy international, put things in a realistic context. As he explains, there are both theoretical and practical considerations. The Souda base, like Cyprus, has been explicitly targeted by the Iranian régime. There have been various announcements, by both the theocratic régime and the Revolutionary Guards, in which Souda is included among other bases as a target.
Among the substantial arsenal of missile types possessed by Iran, the medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) such as the Shahab-3 and the Sejjil have an effective range of 1,000 to 2,000 km, making them capable of striking targets as far away as southeastern Europe. Possibly a greater threat is the Korramshahr-4 missile, which is capable of evasive manoeuvres, can carry a heavy payload, incorporates stealth technology and has a range estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 km. However it is not known if it is operational. Also a threat to the bases of the Middle East are cruise missiles such as the Soumar and Paveh, which have an estimated range of 1,500 to 2,500 km.
Taking that into account, Dr Lyristis explains that: “on the basis of the customary rules of war, the Iranians are theoretically ‘justified’ in striking the places which represent a threat to them, such as the American base at Souda. Theoretically therefore, the answer as to whether the Souda base is a target is Yes.”

What applies in practice
In practice, however, Dr Lyristis believes that the situation is completely different. “The Souda air base can constitute a target only for Iran’s long-range missile systems. They have the range, but my own estimation is that in no case is there the slightest likelihood of the Souda base being hit.”
As he explains, the reason is a purely operational one. In order to have any hope of penetrating the different levels of air defence, Iran would have to mount a mass attack. This would mean committing an enormous flight of at least 50 missiles and drones. This flight would have to run a veritable gauntlet of defensive fire: the Israeli air defences, the US aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean, ground-based US systems and finally Greek airspace and the native interception system. Souda’s defences, therefore, would not be standing alone against the attack, but as the last link in a lengthy chain.
Crete’s defences
In this last link of the chain, in Crete, the only system capable of countering modern long-range missiles, and then only under very specific conditions, is the American Patriot system. Patriots, in the updated version PAC-03+, have been transferred to Chania, offering a radar range of 170 km and the capacity to simultaneously engage 9 different targets. The Russian S-300 PMU1 (range 150 km), which was incorporated into the Greek Air Force in the year 2000, is thought to be probably no longer operational.
The American Patriot system is Crete’s one effective defence against modern long-range missiles.

Short-range defence (SHORAD), is composed of the Russian mobile TOR-M1 system and the French Crotale NG/GR (range 20 km), designed for low- and medium-altitude interception, which would counter cruise missiles and drones. Finally, close-range protection is afforded by the Velos system, of Swiss origin, which combines missiles with rapid-fire cannon, and by shoulder-launched Stinger missiles and MK 20 anti-aircraft machine guns with an operational range of 1.2 to 2.5 km.
Crete will have 2 hours’ notice
The element of time also comes into the balance. Dr Lyristis reveals that a hypothetical missile launch from Iran would be located by American radar within 1.5 minutes. Given that a flight to Crete would last 2 hours, all the forces involved would be at maximum readiness, eliminating any chance of surprise.
The most important factor, however, is that of military priorities. According to Dr Lyristis, if Iran decided to dispatch 50 ballistic missiles against Souda, it would be removing from its arsenal highly useful weapons which it has vital need of to use against much closer and more immediate targets in the Persian Gulf.
Possible duration of the war
As regards the ongoing use of the base in the current crisis, Dr Lyristis explained that its role is primarily one of support. Although US military assets were previously parked there, the distances are considered far too great, for example, for an F-35 to take off from Chania to strike Iran. The base is being used by in-flight refuelling aircraft such as the KC-130 and radar surveillance planes.
Asked about the duration of the war, Dr Lyristis gave the opinion that it will last at least another week, and will end only when the majority of Iranian ballistic missiles and air-defence installations have been destroyed. At present, he said, the situation is extremely chaotic and time will be needed for a clear picture to emerge of the actual damage caused and the intentions of both sides.
(Haniotika Nea, 02/03/26)
The case of Cyprus
If Crete is judged too far from the main action to be vulnerable, Cyprus is clearly not. Three drones were targeted at the RAF Akrotiri air base on the island at the weekend, one of them reaching its target and damaging the runway. With Cyprus on heightened alert, Greece has despatched two frigates and four F-16 jets to the island to bolster its air defences.

The first frigate, the Kimon, is the first of the new French-built Belharra frigates to be delivered to Greece, being commissioned only 2 months ago. It has advanced anti-missile capacities, while the second, Hydra class frigate, Psara, is equipped with the Centaur anti-drone system which sends drones off-course by interfering with their navigation system. Stationed off Cyprus, these assets would no doubt have the advantage of adding another layer of defence in the unlikely event of a missile attack on Crete.
However, it appears that the drones were launched not from Iran but by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and while causing alarm in Cyprus the incident does not so far seem to be considered to have increased the risk to Souda. As reported in today’s Haniotika Nea (03/03/26), official sources are inclined to support the theories of Dr Lyristis. Speaking to to the media yesterday, Government spokesman Pavlos Marinakis said that there was no cause for public alarm. A spokesman for the US base said that they were unable to comment on specific measures being taken, but “We are continually monitoring a variety of factors which determine which measures we should adopt or modify for the protection of our installations, our personnel and their families.”
In the meantime, the entire leadership of Greece’s Armed Forces visited Souda on Sunday to study the intensified security measures decided on during a meeting of the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA). According to what the Haniotika Nea describes as “reliable sources”, the group included the Chief of General Staff General Dimitrios Houpis and the Chiefs of Staff for the Navy, Vice Admiral Dimitrios-Eleftherios Kataras; Army, Lieutenant General Georgios Kostidis; and Air Force, Lieutenant General Dimosthenes Grigoriadis.